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MARKETING OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PUBLIC 
PENSION PLANS: ACHIEVING TRANSPARENCY 
THROUGH LOBBYING REGULATIONS? 
ABSTRACT 
In the past decade, public pension plans and their outside investment 
advisers have been at the center of scandals involving bribery, blatant asset 
mismanagement, and widespread corruption. In response to this corruption, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and many state legislatures 
have adopted laws addressing “pay-to-play,” the custom of making political 
contributions or other payments to state or local officials in return for an 
opportunity to “play”—invest the public pension fund money. This Note 
examines certain pay-to-play legislation enacted by state and local gov-
ernments seeking to regulate investment advisers and public pension plans 
through the promulgation of lobbying regulations. As such, the Note will 
provide an in-depth analysis of the laws arising from the original govern-
mental bodies to create this type of pay-to-play: New York City and the 
State of California. The Note will examine this trend in other states and 
look at another layer of regulations, coming not from states, but from public 
pension plans themselves. Finally, this Note will discuss the transaction costs 
associated with this trend and propose a compliance protocol for investment 
advisers, laying out the most efficient method by which investment advisers 
can attempt to comply with the multitude of pay-to-play regulations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, public pension plans and their outside investment 
advisers have been at the center of scandals involving bribery, blatant asset 
mismanagement, and widespread corruption.1 Public pension plans are 
among the largest investors2 and, in the aggregate, control over $4.8 trillion 
in assets.3 Given their size, importance, and “tens of millions of people who 
rely” on public pension plans, any corruption within or affecting public pen-
sion plans is a serious issue that must be addressed.4 
In response to corruption, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and many states’ legislatures have adopted laws addressing “pay-to-
play,” the practice of exchanging political contributions or other payments 
to state or local officials for an opportunity to “play”—manage and invest the 
public pension fund money.5 More specifically, pay-to-play refers to various 
arrangements by which investment advisers may seek to influence the award 
of advisory business by making or soliciting political contributions to gov-
ernment officials charged with awarding such business.6 The SEC’s pay-to-
play rule, SEC Rule 206(4)-5,7 regulates SEC-registered investment advisers’ 
political contributions to candidates, elected politicians, commissions, and 
                                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., Imogen Rose-Smith & Ed Leefeldt, Shadow Lands, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR, Oct. 2009, at 44 (describing a six-month investigation into the “dark 
underworld” of public pension funds by way of backroom deals mixing political 
patronage, vast amounts of assets, and the lack of effective regulation that creates a 
corrupt situation); Calpers Disclosure of Placement Fees Paid to Ex-board Member, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001 
&sid=a2MI8a3PJ.jk (describing Institutional Investor’s findings about the public pension 
plan allocation process as “everyone must pay-to-play .... This sinister game enriches those 
who play—the hedge fund and private equity managers, consultants, placement agents, 
pension officials and politicians—at the cost of taxpayers and pension beneficiaries.”). 
See generally Public Employee Retirement Systems, AFSCME, http://www.afscme.org 
/union/retirees/resources/retiree-tools-and-information/public-employee-retirement-systems 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (listing all public employee retirement systems).  
2 Table: The 2012 largest retirement plans at a glance, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 
(Feb. 6, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120206/INTERACTIVE/120 
209913/table-the-2012-largest-retirement-plans-at-a-glance. 
3 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS 
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2013 
82 tbl.L.118 (Dec. 9, 2013).  
4 See, e.g., Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 42. 
5 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c)(3) (West 2013); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3-211(c)(1) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.90 (West 2013); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 
(2013) [hereinafter SEC RULE 206(4)-5]. 
6 SEC RULE 206(4)-5. 
7 Id. 
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government committees. Importantly, SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt 
existing state and local pay-to-play rules.8  
As SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt state and local rules, investment 
advisers marketing to public pension plans across states are left with the task 
of complying with an assortment of varying and inconsistent regulations.9 
This Note focuses on jurisdictions that have developed laws requiring in-
vestment advisers to register as lobbyists if they interact in certain ways 
with public pension plans. For instance, New York City and California re-
quire investment advisers to register as lobbyists and comply with the re-
porting requirements of relevant lobbying laws if they solicit investments 
from government pension plans.10 Lobbying is defined by section 3-211(c)(1) 
of New York City’s Administrative Code as an attempt to influence “any 
determination made by ... an officer or employee of the city with respect to 
the procurement of ... services ... including ... the solicitation, award, or ad-
ministration of a contract ... involving the disbursement of public monies.”11 
This lobbying definition has been interpreted to include the marketing of 
investment advisers to government pension plans.12 Consequently, invest-
ment advisers may be subject to the registration requirements and regula-
tions governing lobbyists.13 This lobbyist definition does not comport with 
traditional conceptions of investment advisory firm employees and the role 
of legislative lobbyists.14 The new lobbying laws also create additional 
compliance burdens for investment advisers, public pension plans, and 
                                                                                                                         
8 SEC Release No. IA-3043, File No. S7-18-09, Political Contributions by Certain 
Investment Advisers 146 (July 1, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/ia-3043.pdf 
[hereinafter SEC Release No. IA-3043]. 
9 SEC RULE 206(4)-5. 
10 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c)(3); N.Y.C, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1). 
11 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1)(iii). 
12 Letter from Patrick Synmoie, Counsel to the City Clerk, Office of the City Clerk of 
New York City (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/cc-lobbying 
lawletter.pdf (claiming that certain financial services firms doing business with New York 
City’s pension funds may be required to register as lobbyists). 
13 Id. 
14 Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitu-
tional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 149 (1993). 
The very word ‘lobbying’ unfailingly evokes images of furtive influence 
peddlers lurking in the lobbies outside congressional meeting places, 
awaiting their opportunity to pounce on defenseless elected officials and 
‘buttonhole’—the catchword of the lobby critic—them until they agree, 
however reluctantly, to sacrifice the public welfare to appease whatever 
special interest the lobbyist happens to represent that day. 
Id. See generally U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618–19 (1954) (discussing the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act and that it applies to persons whose principal purpose is “[t]he 
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.”). 
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enforcement agencies by broadening lobbyist definitions and expanding 
reporting requirements to investment advisers. As a result, these new lobby-
ing laws unnecessarily complicate methods of monitoring and compliance 
by trying to liken investment advisers to traditional lobbyists.15 
Labeling investment advisers as lobbyists is counterintuitive and unduly 
burdensome on investment advisers, placement agents, and public pension 
plans; however, this legislation is unlikely to be amended or overturned. 
This Note examines certain pay-to-play legislation enacted by state and local 
governments that target the suspect arrangements by which investment ad-
visers may seek to influence the award of public pension plan assets through 
political contributions. As necessary background, the Note will provide an 
in-depth analysis of the laws arising from the original governmental bodies 
to create pay-to-play legislation regulating investment advisers marketing to 
public pension plans: New York City and the State of California. Examina-
tion of New York City and California’s lobbying laws focuses on their clar-
ity, relevant exemptions, efficiency, reporting requirements, and penalties. 
Through this review, each jurisdiction’s strengths and weaknesses become 
readily apparent. Further, this analysis demonstrates the provisions that best 
achieve the purpose of regulating investment advisers, who seek invest-
ments from public pension plans. 
Following the comparison of the New York City and California proto-
types, the Note will provide a sampling of recent state statutes that attempt 
to regulate pay-to-play issues in their own way. After addressing these state 
laws, the Note will examine another layer of regulations, coming not from 
states, but from public pension plans themselves, illustrating the ever-
growing complexity in this area. These self-imposed regulations govern 
the interaction between investment advisers and public pension plan offi-
cials. These many levels of regulations—federal, state, local, and pension 
plan—create a landscape so wrought with mandates that compliance be-
comes increasingly complex. 
The multiple sources of regulation create uncertainty, resulting in high 
transaction costs and inefficient disclosures. First, it has become difficult for 
investment advisers to fully understand and keep up with the regulatory 
environment. This uncertainty in the law results in increased legal and com-
pliance fees, and therefore increases transaction costs.16 Second, the enhanced 
                                                                                                                         
15 Thomas, supra note 14, at 154–55 (describing the reporting requirements of the 
Lobbying Act, which require traditional lobbyists to “divulg[e] the minutiae of contribu-
tions and expenditures....”). 
16 See generally Gary Slater & David A. Spencer, The Uncertain Foundations of 
Transaction Cost Economics, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 61, 61 (Mar. 2000) (“Uncertainty is a 
core assumption in transaction cost theory.”).  
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reporting requirements require information specific to traditional lobbyists 
and not that of investment advisers, thus creating increased reporting require-
ments that are not as applicable to investment advisers marketing to public 
pension plans. Third, the increased reporting requirements necessitate an in-
crease in expenditures and resources by public pension plans to monitor the 
influx of lobbyist reports and other immaterial information. Thus, these laws 
create uncertainty and increase reporting requirements, while still failing to 
enhance transparency in the public pension plan allocation process. 
Due to these resulting transaction costs, regulating investment advisers 
under the umbrella of lobbyists is not the most efficient solution to increase 
transparency in investment adviser and pension plan interactions. Rather, 
these regulations dilute the flow of meaningful information and increase 
transaction costs to the detriment of public employees: the intended bene-
ficiaries of public pension plans. While the current regulatory system is 
inefficient, it is unlikely to change. Therefore, after analyzing the transaction 
costs associated with these regulations, this Note will propose a compliance 
protocol for investment advisers, laying out the most efficient method by 
which investment advisers can attempt to comply with the multitude of 
pay-to-play regulations. 
I. PENSION PLAN CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGINS 
OF PAY-TO-PLAY LEGISLATION 
A. Overview 
Pay-to-play legislation concerning investment advisers and public pen-
sion plans, and the promulgation of similar laws across the country, is the 
result of highly publicized scandals showcasing high-stake bribes, disregard 
for rules, inefficient regulatory oversight, and blatant abuse of government 
power. Due to their significant amount of assets,17 managing public pension 
plans assets is highly coveted and sought after among investment advisers.18 
These conditions inevitably create an environment prone to corruption. 
Investment advisers marketing to public pension plans have become sub-
ject to government pay-to-play regulations. The public pension plans’ em-
ployees, who are charged with managing pension plan assets, are considered 
government officials under certain lobbying laws.19 These government em-
ployees often have the sole discretion to select investment advisers, who then 
make investment decisions for government public plans.20 As governmental 
                                                                                                                         
17 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
18 SEC Release No. IA-1812; File No. S7-19-99, Political Contributions by Certain In-
vestment Advisers (Aug. 5, 1999), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia-1812.htm#foot36. 
19 See, e.g., Letter from Michael A. Cardozo, N.Y. Corporation Counsel, to Michael 
McSweeney, N.Y. City Clerk 1 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads 
/pdf/placmentagents.pdf. 
20 Id. at 1–2 (discussing the governance structure of New York City’s five pension plans). 
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officials are authorized to allocate a certain amount of public pension plan 
assets to alternative investment advisers, such as hedge funds and private 
equity funds, this allocation of government money qualifies as government 
activity. Therefore, marketing by investment advisers to public pension 
plans, in some jurisdictions, qualifies as an activity that is subject to lobby-
ing regulations because such marketing necessarily includes engaging with 
government officials with respect to government activity.21 
Pension plan governance structure has been ineffective in mitigating 
scandals stemming from bribery.22 In New York City, only one elected offi-
cial is responsible for managing the pension plans,23 whereas some states, 
such as California,24 have a board of trustees who are appointed, and thus are 
considered elected officials.25 Pension plans in both jurisdictions, however, 
have been the subject of scandals.26 This dynamic is problematic because it 
reveals that governance structure is not effective, and rather, elected officials 
allow outside factors to influence their selection process and reward contrib-
utors with access to public pension plan assets.27 Scandals surrounding mis-
allocation and corruption of pension plan assets highlighted the need for 
accountability and transparency in the government pension plan allocation 
process and triggered the onset of the regulations analyzed in this Note.28 
While regulations are necessary to enhance accountability in the govern-
ment pension fund allocation process, these regulations should be scruti-
nized and analyzed for their effectiveness because the management of the-
se assets affects taxpayers and beneficiaries of the retirement systems, as 
well as publicly held companies29 and the securities markets.30 
                                                                                                                         
21 Dealbook, Hevesi Is Expected to Plead Guilty in Pension Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/hevesi-is-expected-to-plead-guilty-in-pen 
sion-case-2/ [hereinafter Dealbook]. 
22 See infra Part I.B. 
23 Op-Ed., It’s Time to End Pay For Play, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 2009, at A32. 
24 Id. 
25 See generally id. “Whether New York should change its sole trustee arrangement 
needs to be examined. What doesn’t need to wait is campaign financing. Not needing mil-
lions of dollars to run reduces the temptation to abuse the office.” Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1. 
28 For instance, Alan Hevesi, former New York state comptroller, pled guilty to a felony 
count for taking $1 million in gifts, including foreign travel arrangements and campaign 
contributions, from a California money manager. Hevesi, as sole trustee of the pension fund, 
granted $250 million of New York pension assets to the California money manager. See 
Dealbook, supra note 21. 
29 SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 5–13 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. 
Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension 
Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 317 (2008)). 
30 SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 5–13 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
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B.  Scandals Illustrate Need for Transparency 
Public pension funds have certain key elements that render them suscep-
tible to corruption: they control a significant amount of assets, they are a 
highly coveted investment resource for investment advisers, and the officials 
and regulatory entities charged with their oversight lack sufficient resources. 
Corruption across the country involving government pension plans and in-
vestment advisers demonstrated the need for increased regulations, oversight, 
and transparency.31 New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF), 
a state government pension plan, became mired with controversy and served 
as the catalyst to create pay-to-play regulations that require investment 
advisers to register as lobbyists.32 Alan Hevesi, former New York State 
Comptroller, sought investments from other public funds for a private equity 
fund based in California run by his friend and political campaign supporter, 
Elliott Broidy.33 Through his wife, Elliot Broidy made thousands of dollars 
in political contributions to officials with oversight authority of public funds, 
including Hevesi.34 Hevesi, as sole trustee of the pension fund, granted $250 
million of New York pension assets to the California money manager.35 
Ultimately, Hevesi pled guilty to a felony count for taking $1 million in gifts, 
including foreign travel arrangements and campaign contributions.36 Fur-
ther, other investment firms have agreed with New York Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo to pay fines in connection to fees paid to third parties, who 
acted as conduits and solicited business with NYSCRF.37 
As a result of the scandal, when the succeeding New York State Comp-
troller took office, increasing transparency and heightening anti-corruption 
efforts became a top priority.38 NYSCRF, under the control of Comptroller 
                                                                                                                         
FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2009, 78 tbl.L.119 (Mar. 11, 2010)). One 
and a half trillion U.S. dollars is invested in corporate equities. Id. 
31 Lobbyist Regulations’ Impact on Investment Managers—California, New York and 
Beyond, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sidley.com/files/News/a6105e8a 
-8770-44ec-9341-87cdaab80ac4/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7fa3c04a-6373-41d4-5ef 
-d272250eaa53/Investment%20Funds_02.01.11_Lobbyist%20Regulations%20Impact.pdf 
[hereinafter SIDLEY AUSTIN]. 
32 Id. 
33 Dealbook, supra note 21. 
34 Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1. 
35 Dealbook, supra note 21. 
36 Id. 
37 SEC Looked to Muni Rules in Writing Placement Ban, PE MANAGER (Aug. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.privateequitymanager.com/Article.aspx?aID=0&article=4 4800. 
38 Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller, Office of the N.Y. State 
Comptroller, Statement on Hevesi Sentencing (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www 
.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/apr11/041511.htm (“Since taking office, I have changed the 
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Thomas DiNapoli, adopted very conservative pay-to-play rules. These rules 
are not state regulated, but rules adopted by the NYSCRF.39 First, NYSCRF 
banned pay-to-play practices, which prohibits NYSCRF from doing busi-
ness with any investment adviser who has made a political contribution to 
the State Comptroller or a candidate for State Comptroller.40 The ban par-
allels SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and its subsequent regulations. This ban lasts for 
two years from the date of the contribution.41 Second, NYSCRF bans the use 
of placement agents, registered lobbyists, and other paid intermediaries so-
liciting investments.42 A placement agent or a paid intermediary is a firm or 
person hired by investment advisers to connect investment advisers with 
potential investors. A placement agent or paid intermediary’s pay is usually 
contingent upon the successful matching of investors with investment ad-
visers. The ban also includes entities compensated on a flat fee, a contingent 
fee, or any other basis.43 
A scandal similar to NYSCRF and subsequent enactment of pay-to-
play legislation occurred in California. A former top official of California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), Frederico Buenrostro, 
was charged by the SEC with defrauding the pension plan into paying $20 
million to a private equity firm represented by his friend.44 In this case, 
CalPERS, was “victimized by its own board member in a clever pay-to-play 
scheme,”45 in which Buenrostro conspired to scam “the pension fund into 
paying millions of dollars in fees for a $3 billion investment” deal.46 The 
SEC successfully argued that Buenrostro created documents to make Apollo 
Global Management, a private equity firm, believe that CalPERS had approved 
the payments to Buenrostro’s friend.47 The scheme revealed inadequacies 
                                                                                                                         
way the pension fund does business so history cannot repeat itself. I have banned placement 
agents and pay-to-play practices, and I have increased transparency in pension fund trans-
actions. But there is more that can be done.”). 
39 Pension Reforms, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, https://www.osc 
.state.ny.us/pension/reform.htm# (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 These rules will be discussed in depth in Part III.B.1. 
44 Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Charges Former Calpers Chief with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/s-e-c-files-fraud 
-charges-against-former-calpers-chief/. 
45 Today's Calpers Scandal Only Latest Chapter in Story of Corruption in the Public 
Fund Industry; Magazine Calls Lawmakers to Action to Eliminate Pay-to-Play, BLOOM-
BERG (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5 
xSGl3ZJBuQ. 
46 Karen Gullo & Michael B. Marois, Ex-Calpers CEO Buenrostro Indicted Over 
Apollo Investment, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/2013-03-18/ex-calpers-ceo-buenrostro-indicted-over-apollo-investment.html. 
47 Id. 
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in the pension plan’s asset allocation process. As a result of the scandal, 
CalPERS co-sponsored a bill that increased disclosure requirements and 
bans on payments to intermediaries and lobbyists.48 
Pay-to-play scandals across the country reveal that corruption and brib-
ery are national and systemic problems. In Ohio, the Chief Financial Officer 
of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation misallocated $19 billion due 
to bribes and “gifts” from placement agents.49 Some of these “gifts” came in 
the form of payments towards his child’s college “tuition and use of a lux-
ury condominium in Florida.”50 This scheme illustrates the craftiness and 
extent to which placement agents and money managers will go to attain in-
vestment management positions from public pension plans.51 As “pay-to-
play casts its shadow nationwide”52 and similar scandals occurring in Texas 
and New Mexico further demonstrate, the investment adviser and govern-
ment pension plan relationship is conducive to corruption.53 
C. Overview of Pay-to-Play: SEC Rule 206(4)-5 
In July 2010, in response to the scandals discussed above, the SEC 
adopted Rule 206(4)-5, pay-to-play regulation that bans political contribu-
tions by SEC-registered investment advisers to candidates running for po-
sitions that could influence the allocation of public pension funds.54 These 
regulations were adopted to regulate how investment advisers interact with 
government personnel.55 Pay-to-play rules apply to government pension plans 
because certain pension plan personnel are considered government officials.56 
Thus, the SEC pay-to-play rule sought to regulate the ways in which invest-
ment advisers, or any other person, doing business with public pension plans 
may operate with respect to solicitation of investment opportunities. 
                                                                                                                         
48 Cuomo’s Pay-To-Play Saga Comes Full Circle, PE MANAGER (May 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.privateequitymanager.com/Article.aspx?aID=0&article=60825. 
49 Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 41. 
50 Id. at 42. 
51 Id. at 42. 
52 Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 41. 
53 See, e.g., James Drew, State Veils Peddling of Pension Investments, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, July 22, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15347567 (discussing a scandal in Texas); 
Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing a civil suit filed in New Mexico, in 
which “the former CIO of the $8.5 billion New Mexico Educational Retirement Board … 
has risen from obscurity by filing two ‘whistle blower’ lawsuits, both alleging that allies of 
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had pressured the ERB into making investment 
decisions ‘tainted by political considerations and contributions.’”). 
54 SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 26–29, 202. 
55 Id. at 11–19. 
56 Id. at 6. See also supra Part I.A (explaining why the marketing of investment advisers 
to government pension plans is considered government official activity). 
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The SEC Rule 206(4)-5 contains three significant prohibitions: (i) a two-
year prohibition on any adviser providing compensated services to a gov-
ernment entity following a political contribution to certain officials of that 
entity;57 (ii) a prohibition on using third-party solicitors;58 and (iii) a pro-
hibition on bundling, coordination, or other organizational efforts by ad-
visers to solicit political contributions for certain officials of a government 
entity to which the adviser is seeking to provide services.59 
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 contains certain exceptions that make the pay-to-
play regulations more appropriate for investment advisers,60 particularly the 
de minimis exception and the exception for new employees.61 Nonethe-
less, if an investment advisor falls under one of these exceptions, SEC 
Rule 206(4)-5 contains a requirement to report these exceptions by amend-
ing the annual ADV.62 The de minimis exception creates an exception for 
contributions under $350.63 This exception applies to officials that the cov-
ered associates64 are entitled to vote for at the time of contribution at each 
election. A separate $150 de minimis exception applies to officials that the 
covered associates are not entitled to vote for at the time of the contribution.65 
The exception for certain new employees excludes employee contributions 
more than six months prior to becoming a covered associate.66 If investment 
                                                                                                                         
57 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(1). 
58 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(i). Third-party solicitors are not regulated persons and there-
fore not subject to pay-to-play restrictions on political contributions. 
59 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(ii). 
60 SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 195–96. 
61 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1), (b)(2). 
62 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(3)(ii). See generally Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“Form ADV is the 
uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and state securities authorities. The form consists of two parts. Part 1 
requires information about the investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients, em-
ployees, business practices, affiliations, and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its 
employees.... Beginning in 2011, Part 2 requires investment advisers to prepare narrative 
brochures written in plain English that contain information such as the types of advisory 
services offered, the adviser’s fee schedule, disciplinary information, conflicts of interest, 
and the educational and business background of management and key advisory personnel 
of the adviser.”). 
63 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1). 
64 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(f)(2) (defining “covered associate” as: “(i) any general partner, 
managing member or executive officer, or other individual with a similar status or function; 
(ii) any employee who solicits a government entity for the investment adviser and any 
person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such employee; and (iii) any political action 
committee controlled by the investment adviser or by any of its covered associates”).  
65 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1). 
66 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(2). This exception is narrowly construed and states that it does 
not apply to employees, who after becoming a covered associate, solicit clients on behalf 
of the investment adviser. 
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advisers choose to rely upon the above exceptions, they must disclose the 
contributions that fall under the exceptions by amending the Form ADV.67 
The reporting requirement through the Form ADV implements additional 
restrictions that limit reliance on this exception for many investment ad-
visers and adds another layer of transactional costs.68 
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt existing state and local pay-to-
play rules and does not impose additional reporting requirements. In fact, 
the only SEC reporting requirement with regard to pay-to-play rules is a re-
quirement to update the Form ADV amendments.69 SEC Rule 206(4)-5 is 
silent regarding the requirement for investment advisers to report or register 
with localities and states disclosing campaign contributions. Because the 
rule does not preempt state and local pay-to-play rules, advisers not only 
must comply with general pay-to-play rules, but also with state and local 
regulations applying to investment advisers soliciting plans from public pen-
sion plans. The enactment of state and local lobbyist regulations fills the 
void of disclosure, as discussed below, but the variation and lack of guidance 
creates increased transaction costs, and skews market efficiency. Further-
more, these regulations will lead to a flood of information and materials that 
will more than likely overburden the regulatory agencies and public pension 
plans tasked with their review.70 As a result, the regulations achieve an oppo-
site effect, in which the regulatory agencies and pension plans are clogged 
with inapplicable information that will likely hinder their review of truly 
material issues. 
II. ORIGINS OF LOBBYING DEFINITIONS TO INCLUDE INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS MARKETING TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 
As discussed above, scandals involving public pension plans and in-
vestment advisers revealed the rampant abuse of power and the innovative 
                                                                                                                         
67 Form ADV, supra note 62. 
68 SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(3)(ii). (“In any calendar year, an investment adviser that has 
reported on its annual updating amendment to Form ADV (17 CFR 279.1) that it has more 
than 50 employees is entitled to no more than three exceptions pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(i) 
of this section, and an investment adviser that has reported on its annual updating amendment 
to Form ADV that it has 50 or fewer employees is entitled to no more than two exceptions 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.”). 
69 Form ADV, supra note 62.  
70 See SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 162 (discussing the recordkeeping 
requirements of the SEC’s pay-to-play rule and the resulting burden on investment advisers). 
While the SEC Release explicitly addresses whether the pay-to-play rule complies with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act, the state and local laws do not make reference to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act or any parallel state law. The SEC Release only addresses the burdens of the 
SEC pay-to-play rule. This Note looks beyond SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and addresses the mul-
tiple other levels of regulations imposed on investment advisers, illustrating that, taken as a 
whole, pay-to-play regulations on investment advisers are truly over-burdensome. 
2014] MARKETING TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 255 
 
(yet illegal) methods used to win control of public pension plan assets. 
While SEC Rule 206(4)-5 bans certain pay-to-play practices, it does not im-
pose enhanced reporting requirements to increase transparency. This section 
will analyze the laws of the first two jurisdictions to address pay-to-play 
through legislation, New York City and the State of California. New York 
City is particularly important because New York City is the center of global 
finance71 and thus sets the tone for market norms. The State of California 
has one of the largest public pension funds,72 and thus has a strong vested 
interest in its regulation. The starting point for regulations by both New York 
City and California is an enlarged definition of the term “lobbyist” so that 
certain investment adviser activities related to public pension plans fall within 
its scope.73 This section will analyze each jurisdiction’s definition of lobbyist, 
registration and reporting requirements, lobbyist prohibitions, and penalties 
for noncompliance. Through analysis of both jurisdictions, their differences 
in approach become apparent. After this introduction to each jurisdiction’s 
definitions and regulations, a side-by-side comparison of select provisions 
of the New York City and California prototypes illustrates the problematic 
ambiguities and conflicts among the various laws. 
A. New York City 
1. Lobbyist Definition 
New York City implemented regulations to increase oversight and 
transparency that ultimately require certain investment advisers to register 
as lobbyists. Investment advisers who market to New York City pension 
plans74 now fall within the scope of New York City’s enlarged definition 
of lobbyist. Section 3-211(c)(1) of New York City’s Administrative Code 
defines lobbying as any attempt to influence “any determination made by ... 
an officer or employee of the city with respect to the procurement of ... ser-
vices ... including ... the solicitation, award, or administration of a contract ... 
involving the disbursement of public monies.”75 The definition excludes 
                                                                                                                         
71 Alison Fitzgerald, New York Eclipses London as Financial Center in Bloomberg 
Poll, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001 
&sid=aEC0OYmvvcZM. 
72 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 1. 
73 Id. at 7.  
74 New York City’s pension plans are as follows: (i) the New York City Employees’ 
Retirement System (NYCERS); (ii) the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF); (iii) the 
New York Fire Department Pension Fund (FDPF); (iv) the New York City Teachers’ Retire-
ment System (TRS); and (v) the New York City Board of Education Retirement System 
(BERS). See, e.g., supra note 19.  
75 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1) (2014). 
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“prospective contractors who communicate with ... city contracting officers 
or employees in the regular course of ... the contractor selection process.”76 
This exception is limited to personal communications or appearances by 
either an employee charged with the responsibilities related to contracts or 
persons who provide technical or professional services; it does not apply to 
those in the regular course of business.77 The law also strictly forbids exempt 
individuals from making contact with “elected officials or their deputies” 
during the selection processes.78 
New York City’s definition of lobbyist leaves many ambiguities, partic-
ularly with respect to whether it includes investment adviser firm personnel. 
Although the provisions of the New York City law could be interpreted to 
exclude investment sales activities directed at pension funds, certain relevant 
governmental authorities, including the Office of the City Clerk and the 
Corporation Counsel, stated even normal investment adviser activities that 
involve any communication with public pensions funds could require regis-
tration under the City’s lobbying law.79 Further, the lobbying law applies to 
third-party placement agents and to employees of investment firms when they 
attempt to influence government investment decisions.80 There is a lack of 
clarity and guidance regarding what is meant by “attempt to influence.”81 
Other ambiguities arise from Advisory Opinions issued by New York City’s 
Lobbying Bureau,82 which also suggest “normal sales activities could ... 
require[] registration under the City’s law.”83 As described below, among 
other regulatory burdens placed on investment adviser personnel, lobbyist 
regulations create additional registration and reporting burdens. These re-
porting burdens coupled with ambiguities in New York City law result in 
increased transaction costs. 
                                                                                                                         
76 § 3-211(c)(3)(vi)(A). 
77 See id. 
78 Jake Simpson, Pension IAs Face Lobbyist Label, Burden, COMPLIANCE REPORTER 
1, 11 (April 25, 2011), http://www.iinews.com/site/rss/CR042511.pdf (“‘In some cases the 
deputy officials or the officials themselves may appear at a final presentation even if the 
negotiations were conducted by their staff, and it’s unclear if that would negate the ex-
emption,’ said Edward Pittman, partner with Dechert.”). 
79 Applies to “persons who attempt to influence determinations of the boards of 
trustees of the City’s five pension funds about investments of the pension funds.” See 
Letter from Patrick Synmoie, supra note 12. 
80 Id. 
81 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1). See also Letter from Patrick Synmoie, 
supra note 12. 
82 See N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-2, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html 
/lobbying/2011-2.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 
2011-3, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/lobbying/2011-3.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
83 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7.  
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2.  Registration and Reporting Requirements 
Pursuant to section 3-213 of the New York City Administrative Code, 
lobbyists must file statements of registration annually.84 The statement of 
registration has an income and expenditure threshold.85 Specifically, the 
regulation does not require “any lobbyist who in any year does not expend, 
incur or receive an amount in excess of five thousand dollars of reportable 
compensation and expenses ... for the purposes of lobbying.”86 As the $5,000 
threshold is to be applied cumulatively to expenditures and compensation 
related to all an investment adviser’s clients, the threshold is quite low given 
the expenses and compensation associated with marketing to any of New 
York City’s five pension plans.87 For example, throughout the course of 
fundraising and marketing to investors, including pension plans, investment 
adviser employees will undoubtedly encounter expenses, including travel 
costs to and from meetings, lodging requirements, meals, etc. 
Individuals who reasonably anticipate reaching the $5,000 compensa-
tion threshold by December 15th must register for the upcoming year and 
must comply with ongoing reporting requirements.88 The term “reportable 
compensation” is not defined in the Administrative Code. While “reported 
compensation” is not defined, “compensation” is defined as “any salary, fee, 
gift, payment, subscription, loan, advance or anything of value paid, owed, 
given or promised by the client to the lobbyist for the purpose of lobbying.”89 
Under section 3-216 lobbyists must file periodic reports including: (i) up to 
six bi-monthly Periodic Reports; (ii) Lobbyist Annual Report; (iii) up to six 
Fundraising/Political Consulting Reports; and (iv) Termination Report(s).90 
Therefore, once an investment adviser meets the relatively low $5,000 
threshold, he is subject to a slew of burdensome reporting requirements. 
3. Lobbyist Prohibitions—Contingent Compensation, Gifts, 
and Payments 
New York City regulations prohibit contingent compensation—com-
pensation that is dependent upon whether public pension plan assets are 
                                                                                                                         
84 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-213(a)(1). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(f). 
88 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-213(a)(1). As of January 1, 2014, New York City 
Administrative Code has increased the threshold from $2,000 to $5,000.  
89 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(e). 
90 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-216(a)(1), (2)-(b)(3), (4). 
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awarded.91 This prohibition directly bans placement agents92 from taking 
contingency fees when doing business with New York City pension plans. 
The contingent compensation prohibition is clearly targeted at placement 
agents and does not apply to salaried investment adviser employees.93 With 
respect to gifts and payments, New York City prohibits any person required 
to register as a lobbyist from giving or offering to give a gift to any public 
servant.94 The terms “payment” and “gift” include anything that has “any 
value whatsoever, whether in the form of money, service, loan, travel, enter-
tainment, hospitality, thing or promise, or in any other form.”95 As in most 
jurisdictions, even jurisdictions that have not enacted specific pay-to-play 
legislation, gifts to public officials are prohibited. The analysis of gift policy 
will not be a focus of this Note. 
4. Penalties 
Most investment advisers dealing with New York City pension plans 
will likely act conservatively and preemptively register, in order to ensure 
compliance with lobbyist disclosure reporting regulations. Even the threat of 
a legal proceeding or violation of regulatory laws creates reputational dam-
age and hinders sales activities.96 If an investment adviser or its personnel fail 
to comply with the lobbying laws, they are subject to penalties. A knowing or 
willful violation is considered a Class A misdemeanor and subject to civil 
penalty of up to $30,000 and/or subject to an order to cease all lobbying ac-
tivities for up to sixty days.97 Failure to file a Statement of Registration pur-
suant to section 3-213 is also a Class A misdemeanor and subject to a civil 
penalty of up to $20,000.98 The monetary penalty is certainly consequential 
and serves as a deterrent; however, the cessation of lobbying activities and 
                                                                                                                         
91 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-218 (“No client shall retain or employ any 
lobbyist for compensation, the rate or amount of which compensation in whole or in part 
is contingent or dependent upon legislative, executive, or administrative action where ef-
forts by a lobbyist to influence such action are subject to the jurisdiction of the city clerk, 
and no person shall accept such a retainer or employment.”). 
92 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7. 
93 Placement agents are paid when they successfully “place” investors with investment 
advisers. Placement agents are paid a “finder fee” that is contingent upon the successful 
matching of an investor and an investment adviser. 
94 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-225. 
95 N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules, 53 Tit. § 1-16(b)(5) (2012). 
96 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7. “Because a proceeding against a firm for 
failing to register could hinder sales activities to the City’s pension boards, registration may 
be advisable.” Id. 
97 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-223(a). 
98 Id. 
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reputational damage likely to ensue are the more significant factors invest-
ment advisers will consider in complying with New York City’s lobbying 
laws.99 The prospect of reputational damage and a civil penalty, together, 
renders compliance with the reporting requirements a cost of doing business 
for these investment advisors. 
B. California Law 
1. Definition of Lobbyist 
California amended its existing lobbying laws such that placement agents 
and investment advisers marketing to any of California’s state public retire-
ment plans100 may fall under California’s definition of lobbyist.101 California 
expanded the definition of the term “placement agent” and treats such indi-
viduals or entities as lobbyists for certain purposes.102 Individuals, including 
internal investment manager personnel, and entities that are involved in so-
liciting or finding investment management business, including fund invest-
ments, from California state public retirement systems are thus subject to 
California’s state lobbying laws and regulations.103 California’s lobbyist 
definition includes two categories of covered persons: placement agents and 
investment manager personnel.104 A placement agent is any person hired or 
engaged on behalf of an external manager or another placement agent, who 
earns compensation as a type of “finder, solicitor, marketer, consultant, 
broker or other intermediary” in connection with any type of sale of secu-
rities either, directly or indirectly.105 With respect to investment manager 
personnel, its definition includes all employees “whose activities include 
soliciting or marketing to California public retirement systems and to third 
party investment managers who manage certain investment funds of which 
                                                                                                                         
99 See generally Greg Wolski & Virginia Adams, Anti-corruption Considerations for 
Private Equity Firms, ERNST & YOUNG, available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document 
/view/12410162/anti-corruption-considerations-for-private-equity-firms-ernst-young (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (discussing reputational risks associated with corruption).  
100 State public retirement plans include CalPERS, CalSTRS, and the University of 
California pension system. See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2. 
101 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013). 
102 Id. 
103 Lobbyist Laws May Significantly Impact Marketing of Funds and Advisory Services 
to California and New York City Plans in 2011, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP 1 (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://www.srz.com/files/News/adc95517-90e6-4cc3-9201-36153ba4f951/Presen 
tation/NewsAttachment/e8af7c80-49fb-47c0-b191-364d7f12c6a4/020311_Lobbyist_Laws 
_May_Significantly_Impact_Marketing_of_Funds_and_Advisory_Services.pdf. 
104 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2. This varies from New York City’s defini-
tion of lobbyist, which has a separate categorization for placement agents. 
105 Id. at 2 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013)). 
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public pension funds are majority owners.”106 On its face, the definition of 
lobbyist, by possibly expanding to include placement agents and investment 
manager personnel, includes any employee who participates in any solicit-
ing or marketing activity directed at government. 
Despite the explicit list of the types of personnel who may be “covered” 
by the lobbying laws, the law does not clarify which activities constitute so-
licitation or marketing. In turn, this lack of clarification creates ambiguity in 
determining who is a “covered” person. Materials published by the California 
Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) emphasize that business or in-
vestment contact between investment adviser employees and state public re-
tirement system personnel is a key criterion for determining what activity is 
covered.107 Yet the FPPC guidance still leaves ambiguities, and neither the 
statute nor legislative history provides clarification of the level or type of 
contact that would render an individual to be “soliciting” or “marketing.”108 
Confusion arises in determining whether contact is merely official in nature, 
and whether contact that occurs to responses to due diligence inquiries qual-
ifies as soliciting or marketing. As such, employees whose principal respon-
sibilities involve sales, marketing, or investor relations most likely qualify as 
“covered,” such that they qualify as lobbyists under the regulation as soon 
as they begin contacting state public retirement system personnel in any way 
that relates to potential business.109 Organizations, whose employees are 
“covered” by the lobbying laws, are deemed a “Lobbyist Employer”110 and 
must comply with regulations for “Lobbyist Employers.”111 This is yet an-
other layer of compliance that further increases transaction costs. 
2. Registration and Reporting Requirements 
California’s law contains reporting requirements that further complicate 
compliance with various pay-to-play regulations.112 Individuals who are 
                                                                                                                         
106 Id. at 2 (emphasis added); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013). 
107 See, e.g., The Lobbying Provisions of the Political Reform Act, Cal. Fair Political 
Practices Comm’n Asst. Gen. Counsel Op. 11-1031 4 (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.fppc 
.ca.gov/index.php?id=545&zoom_query=lobbyists+contact+public+retirement+system+per 
sonnel&zoom_cat=21&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=0&zoom_sort=0 (click on docu-
ment “11-031”). 
108 See Placement Agents, 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 668 (A.B. 1743) (West), available 
at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB1743& 
search_keywords=; Cary J. Meer et al., California Regulates Investment Managers’ Place-
ment Agents and Solicitors as Lobbyists, K & L GATES 2 (Nov. 2010), http://m.klgates.com 
/files/Publication/fd5d02d6-dda1-4c15-bb4c-01181806bb70/Presentation/PublicationAttach 
ment/7b06f446-2656-4eb6-a085-0af45ac5d8ef/IM_alert_111710.pdf. 
109 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2. 
110 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039.5(a)–(b) (West 2013). 
111 See Form 635, Report of Lobbyist Employer and Report of Lobbying Coalition, CAL. 
SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/forms/form-635.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
112 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039.5(a). 
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lobbyists must file quarterly reports—Form 615113—to their employers 
within two weeks after each calendar quarter ends.114 The report includes 
disclosure of matters actively lobbied, itemization of activity expenses in-
curred or arranged during the quarter, and a description of political contri-
butions of $100 or more.115 
Lobbyist employers’ reports focus on payments to and from lobbyist 
employees. Employers of lobbyists must file a report on Form 635 along 
with their Lobbyist employees’ Forms 615 by the end of the month follow-
ing each calendar quarter-end.116 The Form 635 requires disclosure with re-
spect to payments made in connection with lobbying activities, portion of 
salaries paid to employees who are lobbyists, and identification of lobbyist 
routine expenses and similar payments made to influence legislative or ad-
ministrative action.117 Lobbyist employers are responsible for having a rec-
ordkeeping system to ensure the accuracy and reliability of all information 
related to lobbying activity.118 In addition to the reporting requirements, lob-
byists must attend mandatory ethics training that is only offered in California 
and not offered online.119 The mandatory ethics training is an extraordinary 
cost, in terms of both time and money, for investment advisers. The Forms 
615 and 635 place a large disclosure burden on both lobbyists and their em-
ployers, creating unnecessarily high transaction costs as a result.  
3.  Lobbyist Prohibitions—Contingent Compensation, Gifts, 
and Payments 
California law bars contingent compensation.120 Specifically, lobbyists 
and their employers are prohibited from making “any payment in any way 
contingent upon the defeat, enactment, or outcome of any proposed legisla-
tive or administrative action.”121 Under the new regulations, this contingent 
                                                                                                                         
113 See Lobbying Quarterly Disclosure Reports—Forms Required, CAL. SEC’Y 
OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/lobbying-info/filing-requirements/required-docs-lob 
-quarterly.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (providing a complete list of lobbying reports 
required by California). 
114 See Form 615, Lobbyist Report, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, www.sos.ca.gov/prd/forms 
/form-615.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
115 Id. 
116 See Form 635, supra note 111. 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 See AB 1743 Fact Sheet Placement Agents: Lobbying Registration Requirements, 
CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N 1, 3 (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.fppc.ca.gov 
/factsheets/009-122010PlacementAgentFS.pdf. 
120 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86205(f) (West 2013). 
121 Id. 
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compensation ban applies to both activities of placement agents and “cov-
ered” investment management personnel.122 In this respect, the California ban 
is similar to the New York City prohibition on contingent compensation.123 
California’s regulation only allows nominal gifts and payments made 
by lobbyists. Lobbyists are prohibited from making political contributions to 
officers of the state agency with whom the lobbyist is registered to lobby.124 
For example, a lobbyist registered in California is prohibited from making 
political contributions to any California state candidate, such as a California 
State Senator or California Governor.125 Specifically, the law bars the making 
of gifts over $10 per month to any such officials of any government agency 
to whom the lobbyist is registered to lobby.126 Both the contingent compen-
sation ban and the regulations regarding gifts and payments are fairly con-
sistent across states;127 therefore, while the inclusion of this information is 
helpful to provide a full picture of the lobbying laws, it is not of particular 
importance with respect to the analysis in this Note. 
4.  Penalties 
Failure to comply with California’s lobbyist regulations results in both a 
monetary fine and a ban from soliciting new business.128 First, any knowing 
or willful violation of the provision is a misdemeanor.129 Second, the mone-
tary penalty is “[a] fine of up to the greater of $10,000 or three times the 
amount the person failed to report properly or unlawfully contributed, ex-
pended, gave, or received.”130 Third, the failure to comply with regulations 
results in a ban from soliciting new business from the retirement system, or 
any government agency, for five years.131 The fine and the ban from solic-
iting new business, while significant statutory penalties, are probably less of 
a concern than the reputational damage an investment adviser might incur 
by facing a penalty or paying a settlement.132 
                                                                                                                         
122 See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2. 
123 Id. at 2, 5, 7. 
124 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013). 
125 Id. 
126 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86203 (West 2013). 
127 See supra Part II.B.3, Part II.C.3. 
128 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(a)-(b) (West 2013); SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, 
at 6. 
129 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(a). 
130 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(b). 
131 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 6. 
132 See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, ‘Pay to Play’ Pact Yields $24 Million for New Mexico, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788 
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C. New York versus California Prototypes 
While previous sections of this Note set the background of New York 
City and California’s lobbyist regulations for investment advisers, both laws 
contain exemptions that further confuse identifying which activity constitutes 
lobbying and which firm personnel are subject to regulation. Comparison of 
the relevant exemptions side-by-side helps demonstrate the significant differ-
ences in the two regulatory methods and the complexities investment advisers 
face while interpreting the regulations. Analysis reveals that both prototypes 
fail to achieve their purpose because their definitions of lobbying activity 
and purported exemptions are unclear. The resultant maze of definitions and 
exemptions to those in the industry increases the cost of doing business to a 
debilitating extent. 
Pay-to-play regulations are constantly evolving. More and more states 
are adopting laws impacting marketing from investment advisers to pension 
plans. Industry professionals have suggested the regulatory situation in New 
York is complicated because city officials re-interpreted existing law rather 
than making new rules.133 For example, New York City Administrative Code 
section 3-211(c)(vi)(A) provides an exception for “contractors or prospective 
contractors who communicate with or appear before city contracting officers 
or employees in the regular course of procurement planning ... [or] city con-
tracting officers or employees in the regular course of the administration of 
a contract are not engaged in lobbying.”134 The problem arises from the fact 
that this exception does not clarify which activity qualifies as in the “regular 
course” of procurement planning or administration of a contract. The Office 
of the City Clerk has issued several advisory opinions that attempt to clarify 
the meaning of the exemptions. In an advisory opinion, the City Clerk deter-
mined that “communications between investment managers, who have been 
solicited through the procurement process,”135 in the regular course of pro-
curement planning fall within the exception. This exception is contingent 
                                                                                                                         
7323864304578320453711310538.html; Chad Bray, Adviser, Lobbyist to Pay $1.5 
Million in Pay-to-Play Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504576007592042897326.html. See also supra 
Part II.A.4. 
133 See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text. New York City Lobbying Bureau 
regularly issues advisory opinions, which are available on their website. In 2011 the New 
York City Lobbying Bureau issued two advisory opinions discussing exceptions to the 
obligation to register as a lobbyist for marketing to pension funds. 
134 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(3)(vi)(A) (2014). 
135 N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-3, supra note 82 (explaining the proper 
procurement procedures for selecting investment advisers and issues of request for pro-
posals (RFP)). 
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upon whether the communication is through the procurement process136 or 
in response to requests for proposals.137 Second, the City Clerk determined 
that communications between employees of investment managers that have 
an existing contract with a fund are not lobbying.138 Despite the continued 
ambiguities seemingly acknowledged by the Office of City Clerk, New 
York City’s regulatory agency remains steadfast in threatening to enhance 
scrutiny on the investment activities.139 
California law contains two exemptions around onerous lobbying require-
ments that make its law more reasonable than New York City’s Adminis-
trative Code. First, the one-third exemption covers internal adviser firm 
personnel who spend at least one-third of their time on portfolio management. 
Second, the competitive bidding exception covers internal personnel of reg-
istered advisers who will be selected through a competitive bidding process 
and has agreed to a fiduciary standard of care.140 The one-third exemption 
states that the definition of “placement agents” does not include an invest-
ment manager’s employees who spend at least one-third of their time during 
a calendar year “managing the securities or assets owned, controlled, invested 
or held by the [investment] manager.”141 With these exclusions, an invest-
ment adviser can skirt the lobbyist registration requirement by limiting 
involvement in solicitation of California public retirement system business 
to internal personnel who satisfy the one-third exemption. 
                                                                                                                         
136 See 4 THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 8 (N.Y. Legal Publ’n Corp. 2011),  
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mocs/ppb/downloads/pdf/April2010rulesmodifiedMar2011pdf (de-
fining procurement as: “Buying, purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise acquiring any 
goods, services, or construction. It also includes all functions that pertain to the obtaining 
of any good, service, or construction, including planning, description of requirements, 
solicitation and selection of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all phases of 
contract administration, including receipt and acceptance, evaluation of performance, and 
final payment.”). 
137 See N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-2, supra note 82 (“It is the determina-
tion of the City Clerk that persons who attempt to influence the Pension Funds’ decisions to 
enter into limited partnership agreements or contracts for alternative investments such as real 
estate investment funds, private equity funds, and hedge funds are engaged in ‘lobbying’ 
or a ‘lobbying activity’ as defined in the Administrative Code. However, if those persons 
are responding to a request for information by the staff of the Comptroller’s office or a 
Pension Fund they would not be engaged in ‘lobbying’ or a ‘lobbying activity’ because 
such communications are exempt under Administrative Code § 3-211(c)(3)(v).”). 
138 N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-3, supra note 82. 
139 Letter from Patrick Synmoie, supra note 12 (“Beginning in January 2011, this office 
will be reviewing the activities of individuals, businesses, and organizations that, as of 
January 1, 2011, are attempting to influence investment decisions made by pension funds 
and retirement systems of New York City. Parties that fail to comply with the Lobbying 
Law will be subject to … penalties ....”). 
140 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c) (West 2013). 
141 Id. 
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While the one-third exemption makes California’s lobbying law more 
manageable for investment advisers, it still leaves several ambiguities. 
First, the exemption does not specify how to measure the “calendar year.”142 
If the exclusion is interpreted literally, then the investment adviser must have 
spent at least a full calendar year managing assets for one-third of his or her 
time in order for the exclusion to apply. If so, then the exclusion is unavail-
able for employees at new firms or newly hired employees. Other situations, 
such as employees hired laterally who were working in investment advisory 
roles previously, reveal the complications that can arise from interpreting this 
exemption. However, a more flexible standard is readily available: make the 
calendar year requirement subject to a good faith projection of the invest-
ment professional’s estimated allocation of yearly assigned duties and histor-
ical responsibilities.143 Assembly Bill 1743 is the bill that amended existing 
California law to expand the definition of lobbyist and require reporting 
standards.144 Neither AB 1743,145 its legislative history,146 nor the FPPC 
offer any guidance regarding how to interpret the calendar year requirement. 
Furthermore, in opinions distributed by law firms, it is suggested that “be-
cause the ‘placement agent’ definition applies so differently than the tradi-
tional ‘lobbyist’ definition, analogies drawn from FPPC’s existing guidance 
may not be helpful” in interpreting the calendar year rule.147 A second am-
biguity is that the one-third exemption does not identify which particular 
activities fall under the description of managing assets. An individual whose 
position includes creating the investment fund’s portfolio and deciding which 
securities to invest is a clear example of an employee whose responsibilities 
fall within the description of “managing assets.”148 In contrast, it is less clear 
whether “managing assets” includes the majority of individuals whose re-
sponsibilities are related to managing assets but are not responsible for the 
actual investment decision. 
The competitive bidding exception under section 82047.3 of California  
Code provides that investment firm personnel are excluded from the “place-
ment agent” definition, with respect to public retirement system contacts if 
the investment adviser: 
(i) is registered with the SEC or an appropriate state regulator as an in-
vestment adviser or broker-dealer; (ii) has been selected through a 
competitive bidding process subject to specified California laws and is 
                                                                                                                         
142 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 3. 
143 Id. at 3. 
144 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 668 (A.B. 1743) (West).  
145 Id. 
146 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
147 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 3. 
148 Id. at 3. 
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providing services pursuant to a contract executed as a result of that 
competitive bidding process; and (iii) has agreed to a fiduciary standard 
of care as to the state public retirement system’s investments.149 
While California’s exclusions from the lobbyist definition leave fewer 
ambiguities than New York City’s exemptions, both jurisdictions’ laws cre-
ate confusion as to what particular activity constitutes lobbying under the 
statutes. California and New York City’s regulations have paved the way for 
other states to police the interaction between pension funds and investment 
advisers.150 As such, the analysis above involves only two jurisdictions and 
does not reflect a complete picture of the regulatory environment in which 
investment advisers market to public pension plans. The next Part provides 
a sampling of developments in other states’ legislatures and of internal reg-
ulations by public pension plans to provide a more accurate picture of the 
many layers of lobbying laws challenging investment advisers. As the layers 
build on top of already ambiguous predecessors, the transactional costs for 
dealing in this environment continue to grow. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
& PENSION PLAN REGULATIONS 
A. Development of Laws in Other States 
In reviewing the development of lobbying laws in other states, it is in-
teresting to note that many of the regulations do not follow the precedent 
established by the New York City or California prototypes, but rather, states 
are taking their own approaches to regulate the interaction between invest-
ment advisers and government pension plans. This variance in states’ laws 
further complicates and confuses the regulatory environment. 
1. Ohio 
While New York City and California expanded their definitions of 
lobbyist to include certain investment adviser activities, Ohio created a sep-
arate category to define the interaction between investment advisers and 
public pension plans, labeled as “retirement system lobbying activity.”151 
Ohio Code defines retirement system lobbying activity as: 
contacts made to promote, oppose, reward, or otherwise influence the 
outcome of a retirement system decision by direct communication with 
                                                                                                                         
149 Id. at 3 (discussing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c) (West 2013)). 
150 See infra Part III.A. 
151 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §101.90(I) (West 2013). 
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a member of a board of a state retirement system, a state retirement sys-
tem investment official, or an employee of a state retirement system 
whose position involves substantial and material exercise of discretion in 
the investment of retirement system funds.152 
The Ohio regulation sets forth clear parameters for which activity qual-
ifies as lobbying the retirement system.153 From the language in the statute, 
certain investment advisers marketing to the Ohio Retirement System are 
“influenc[ing] the outcome of a retirement ... decision” and are in direct com-
munication with personnel whose “position involves ... material exercise of 
discretion in the investment of retirement system funds.”154 
The Ohio regulation differs from the New York City and California pro-
totypes in that it creates a distinct category and definition for retirement 
system lobbying.155 Whether the investment adviser’s employee qualifies as 
a retirement system lobbyist depends upon whether the employee is in direct 
communication with a retirement system employee with “material exercise” 
over the system’s assets.156 In reality, most pension plan employees with 
whom investment firm employees communicate will likely fall under this 
qualification, permitting only communications between purely administrative 
personnel. The separate category of “retirement system lobbyists” allows 
for a tailored approach to reporting requirements, only requiring disclosures 
and information that pertain to public pension plans and investment advisers. 
But nonetheless, the determination hinges on whether the employee has 
“material exercise” over system assets, which inherently contains a level 
of ambiguity. 
2. Texas 
In Texas, investment advisers have discretion over whether to register as 
a lobbyist, even if they meet the spending threshold definition.157 Unlike 
Ohio, the Texas Code does not create a new category for retirement system 
lobbying activity. As such, investment advisers marketing to public pension 
plans in Texas must interpret existing law to determine whether their activity 
falls within the legislature’s interpretation of the term lobbyist.158 The code 
                                                                                                                         
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Compare id., with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3 (West 2013), and N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1) (2014). 
156 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §101.90. 
157 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West 2013). 
158 Id. 
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requires an investment adviser to register as a lobbyist if, “as part of his reg-
ular employment, [the employee] has communicated directly with a member 
of the legislative or executive branch to influence legislation or administra-
tive action ... whether or not the person receives any compensation for the 
communication in addition to the salary for that regular employment.”159 
Texas uses a threshold approach and requires registration if an adviser 
exceeds the spending threshold of $200 in a calendar quarter.160 The $200 
threshold applies to an employee’s total expenditure or if an employee re-
ceives, or is entitled to receive, compensation for activities to communicate 
with a member of the executive or legislative branch to influence legislative 
or administrative actions.161 The threshold excludes the employee’s own 
travel, food, or lodging expenses.162 While the threshold approach provides 
certainty, the approach does not seek to regulate the underlying activity it-
self. The Texas Code only specifies that communication with the legislative 
or executive branch qualifies as lobbying—the lobbying definition in the 
Code is silent with respect to public pension plans and whether officials at 
public pension plans are subject to the lobbying registration requirements. 
Despite the lack of clarity in the law, investment advisers who spend greater 
than $200 in connection with marketing to public pension plans in Texas 
have not been categorized as lobbyists and, therefore, have discretion as to 
whether to register as lobbyists.163 
3. New Jersey 
Unlike the Texas and Ohio approach, New Jersey defines “lobbyist” 
broadly, encompassing a large spectrum of interaction with the government. 
Under New Jersey law, a lobbyist is “any person ... that employs, engages or 
otherwise uses the services of any governmental affairs agent to influence 
legislation, regulation or governmental processes.”164 The term “influence 
governmental process” is defined separately as: 
any attempt, whether successful or not, to assist a represented entity or 
group to engage in communication with, or to secure information from, 
an officer or staff member of the Executive Branch, or any authority, 
board, commission or other agency or instrumentality in or of a principal 
                                                                                                                         
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 This section only addresses whether investment advisers have to register as lobbyists 
in Texas. It does not discuss gift policy or other pay-to-play regulations. 
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-20 (West 2013). 
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department of the Executive Branch of State Government, empowered 
by law to administer a governmental process or perform other functions 
that relate to such processes.165 
Thus, the New Jersey statute and accompanying definitions cast a very 
wide net as to what activity constitutes lobbying. Despite the broad definition, 
there is no evidence that investment advisers marketing to New Jersey state 
pension plans have faced any pressure to register as lobbyists.166 While this 
situation could be attributed to fewer publicized scandals related to pay-to-
play and New Jersey pension funds, it also could signal a trend that other ju-
risdictions are refusing to adopt the California and New York City prototypes. 
B.  Pension Plans Impose Regulations 
In addition to the various state-imposed lobbying requirements, invest-
ment advisers also face regulations that are self-imposed by the public pen-
sion plans themselves. This additional layer of regulations further complicates 
the regulatory environment. 
1. NYSCRF 
After the pay-to-play scandal in New York, the new comptroller, 
Thomas P. DiNapoli, reformed the New York State Common Retirement 
Fund (NYSCRF) to make it “one of the most transparent and accountable 
public pension funds in the country.”167 First, DiNapoli changed the fund’s 
policies, including banning pay-to-play practices, banning the use of place-
ment agents, creating a pension fund task force, increasing internal vetting of 
investments, forming a special commission of outside experts, and creating 
                                                                                                                         
165 Id. (defining “government process” as the: “promulgation of executive orders; rate 
setting; development, negotiation, award, modification or cancellation of public contracts; 
issuance, denial, modification, renewal, revocation or suspension of permits, licenses or 
waivers; procedures for bidding; imposition or modification of fines and penalties; proce-
dures for purchasing; rendition of administrative determinations; and award, denial, modi-
fication, renewal or termination of financial assistance, grants and loans.”). 
166 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 1 (noting that while New Jersey law does not 
cover investment advisers marketing to its pension plans, “the lobbying laws of many other 
states or local jurisdictions could cover procurement activities depending on the interpreta-
tions of the relevant government regulators”). 
167 DiNapoli’s Pension Reforms, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMP-
TROLLER, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/reform.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“Like 
all New Yorkers, DiNapoli is outraged by the alleged wrongdoing of the former adminis-
tration and has taken steps to strengthen oversight of the Fund and fix New York’s weak 
campaign finance laws.”). 
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mandatory ethics training.168 Second, NYSCRF increased oversight.169 
The increased oversight included partnering with New York State Insurance 
Department, hiring an external law firm, creating an “inspector general” posi-
tion, and hiring a special counsel on ethics.170 Third, NYSCRF “increased 
transparency in fund transactions” by releasing monthly reporting on in-
vestment transactions, announcing pension fund performance quarterly, and 
creating a review of external investment consultants.171 Finally, NYSCRF 
“[p]roposed Campaign Finance Reform” legislation.172 The increased reg-
ulations and reporting requirements are more comprehensive than the lob-
bying registration requirements imposed by state and local governments. 
2. CalPERS 
Similar to NYSCRF, CalPERS self-imposed enhanced investment pro-
tocols and increased regulations. In reaction to the CalPERS’ scandal dis-
cussed in Part I, CalPERS took “aggressive steps ... to strengthen the pension 
fund’s accountability and ethics, and to ensure full transparency.”173 These 
steps included delegating investment decisions to the Chief Investment 
Officer, “lifting the veil on placement agents,” setting policy for state legis-
lation, special review of fees paid to external managers, and tightening its 
own board governance rules.174 CalPERS’ policies on placement agents led 
the way in placement agent disclosure rules and resulted in the co-sponsorship 
of the legislation discussed in Part II.C. In addition to enhancing governing 
policies, CalPERS increased transparency by putting key investment docu-
ments online and was the first public pension fund to disclose placement agent 
data, which included more than 600 placement agent disclosures obtained by 
the fund from its external managers.175 As of August 1, 2012, CalPERS and 
CalSTERS require reporting placement agent information “to the respective 
chairpersons of the Assembly Committee on Public Employees, Retirement, 
and Social Security and the Senate Committee on Public Employment and 
Retirement.”176 CalPERS took action by ending the use of placement 
agents in new deals. Thus, CalPERS took measures by not only increasing 
                                                                                                                         
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Fact Sheet: CalPERS Strengthens Accountability, Transparency and Ethics, 
CalPERS 1, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/ethics-accountability.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2014).  
174 Id. at 1–3. 
175 Id. at 4–5. 
176 See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, supra note 103, at 5 (citing 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
Ch. 668 (A.B. 1743 § 9) (West)). 
2014] MARKETING TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 271 
 
accountability and reporting requirements but also increasing transparency 
by forcing external managers to disclose information. 
IV. ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES & ECONOMIC COSTS 
A.  Economic Costs 
1.  Cost for Investment Advisers 
Pay-to-play laws have contributed to an increasingly complex regulatory 
environment for investment advisers. Investment advisers are therefore in-
creasing their legal and compliance departments in order to deal with these 
regulations.177 David Sobel, Chief Compliance Officer at Abel/Noser Cor-
poration, has commented that “as the web of regulations has become more 
complex, his workload has expanded by about 25 percent.”178 Further, pen-
sion plans expect investment advisers to have a sophisticated compliance 
structure.179 Industry professionals expect to see increased legal hiring by 
financial institutions to meet their compliance needs.180 Thus, investment 
advisers must increase their budgets and head count to comply with the reg-
ulatory environment. “‘In the last few years, compliance has become a new 
profession within financial services,’ noted Zebrowski, an attorney and CPA 
who runs an alternative investment firm.”181 While a boon for lawyers and 
compliance professionals, increased costs in non-profit generating depart-
ments is a cost that reduces the overall profitability of investment advisers. 
Unfortunately, the increase in regulations and compliance costs do not 
necessarily offset enough corruption to justify the expense. 
2. Cost for SEC 
The SEC has increased its budget to enforce its own pay-to-play laws and 
respond to the increasingly complicated regulatory environment.182 While 
the SEC is not responsible for specific jurisdictions’ pay-to-play rules, it is 
                                                                                                                         
177 Christine Simmons, New Rules Create Jobs for Attorneys at Hedge Funds, 248 N.Y. 
L.J., no. 122, Dec. 26, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticle  
NY.jsp?id=1202582718326&thepage=3slreturn=20130103210738 (subscription required). 
178 Id. at 3. 
179 Id. at 2 (“Asset allocators, such as pension funds, ‘have become more sophisticated 
and expect more from the infrastructure of the firms they’re investing in. They expect there 
to be some legal type or compliance type filling a role in the firm’”). 
180 See, e.g., id. at 3 (quoting Gary Watkins of the ACA Compliance group, “Increased 
regulation leads to more responsibilities and in turn firms may look to increase their resources 
by hiring additional compliance personnel[.]”). 
181 Id. 
182 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 1 
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy12congbudgjust.pdf. 
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necessary for the SEC to understand how the jurisdiction-specific rules re-
late to the federal rules. In its 2012 Budget Justification, the SEC requested 
funds to support its regulatory functions.183 The SEC referenced its steps over 
the past two years to make it “more vigilant, agile, and responsive, and is 
moving on multiple fronts to enhance its effectiveness and provide robust 
oversight of the financial markets” as justification for its increased budget.184 
Further, the SEC created “new senior leadership in key positions” in order 
to create regulations regarding “equity market structure, credit rating agency 
conflicts and disclosure, investment adviser custody controls, money market 
fund resiliency, asset-backed securities, large trader reporting, pay-to-play, 
and municipal securities disclosure.”185 Pay-to-play laws present a new reg-
ulatory burden to which the SEC has to respond. The SEC has “stepped up its 
interest in pay-to-play cases,” and even created a specialized unit that exam-
ines corruption in government bond offerings and bringing actions against 
financial institutions and public officials.186 The SEC has increased its staff-
ing levels and budget as a result of the new regulatory workload.187 
3. Cost for Pension Plans 
As previously addressed, public pension plans have imposed their own 
regulations regarding investment advisers and increased transparency. This 
Note only briefly addresses the associated additional costs incurred by pen-
sion funds, because it is self-evident that with increased regulations, increased 
filings, and increased reporting requirements come increased costs.188 To 
comply with federal, state, and self-imposed regulations, pension funds 
must expend large sums increasing oversight employees or hiring outside 
legal counsel. For example, the NYSCRF hired outside compliance experts 
                                                                                                                         
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (emphasis added). 
186 Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, Goldman to Pay $12 Million to Settle S.E.C. ‘Pay to 
Play’ Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012 
/09/27/goldman-to-pay-12-million-to-settle-s-e-c-pay-to-play-case/. 
187 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, at 1–2: 
SEC staffing levels are just now returning to the level of FY 2005, despite 
the fact that the size and complexity of the securities markets have under-
gone tremendous growth since then. During the past decade, trading vol-
ume has more than doubled, the number of investment advisers grew by 
50 percent, and the funds they manage have increased to $38 trillion.... In 
acknowledgement of this significant new workload, the [Dodd-Frank] Act 
authorized an increase in the agency’s budget from the $1.11 billion appro-
priated in FY 2010 to $1.3 billion in FY 2011, $1.5 billion in FY 2012, 
and $2.25 billion by FY 2015. 
Id. 
188 See supra Part III.B. 
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to conduct a compliance review of every single pension fund transaction.189 
Similarly, NYSCRF releases monthly reports detailing investment transac-
tions and hiring of investment advisers.190 Of course, the pension plans 
can decide not to incur these expenses and simply rely on their current em-
ployees to meet all of these additional burdens. These increased costs, 
while necessary to respond to the heightened regulatory requirements, do 
not directly result in higher profit returns. 
4. Transaction Costs 
The increased transaction costs for public pension funds, investment 
advisers, and the SEC correlate to a decrease in the returns for beneficia-
ries of public retirement systems. Ronald Coase developed the epony-
mously named Coase Theorem, which provides, assuming no transaction 
costs, that parties in repeat transactions will negotiate to the most cost ef-
fective outcome.191 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who 
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal 
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure 
that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These opera-
tions are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to pre-
vent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the 
pricing system worked without cost.192 
The public pension plan and investment adviser relationship should be 
one in which transaction costs are low because as Coase described, there are 
repeat players, who are able to negotiate, and draw up bargains. Unfortu-
nately, the many layers of regulations discussed in this Note create ambiguity 
in the public pension plan allocation process and increase transaction costs. 
Uncertainty creates increased transaction costs.193 The increased transaction 
costs, partially the result of increased compliance needs for investment 
                                                                                                                         
189 The New York State Common Retirement, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMP-
TROLLER, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“Comptroller 
DiNapoli tasked the Mercer Group to conduct a compliance review of the 131 transactions 
approved during DiNapoli's tenure.”).  
190 Disclosure of Investments & Transactions, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMP-
TROLLER, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/disclosure.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
191 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
192 Id. at 15. 
193 See Slater & Spencer, supra note 16, at 61 (explaining that uncertainty “forms the 
basis of the explanation of transaction costs and also provides a vital link in the conceptual 
analysis of the transition from market coordination to internal organization.”).  
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advisers, the SEC, and public pension plans, suggest investment returns 
become more and more inefficient.  
The benefit of increased regulation is the benefit from diminished cor-
ruption in the public pension plan allocation process. For pension plans, the 
cost of corruption is the opportunity cost of the misallocation of funds—that 
is, investing with funds who pay-to-play rather than a more ethical invest-
ment adviser who refuse to pay-to-play. For investment advisers, the costs of 
corruption are reputational damages, regulatory fines, and an uneven play-
ing field. The increased transaction costs are inefficient if they outweigh the 
benefit—the corruption they prevent.  
Investment advisers are forced by these regulations to update existing 
compliance programs, which directly result in higher management fees or 
lower cost-to-profit ratios. Pension plans devote more effort to increasing 
transparency to comply with new regulatory requirements, which leads to 
higher costs and lower return for beneficiaries.194 The SEC, as a result of 
increased regulation and oversight measures, has incurred, and will con-
tinue to incur, incredible costs to regulate the growing uncertain investment 
environment.195 A possible result of the increased costs is an environment 
in which government pension plans diversify less with investment advisers 
because the risk of exposure to pay-to-play scandals is too costly.196 In turn, 
all of these lobbying regulations may result in a lower return for benefi-
ciaries of public retirement systems. 
B. Compliance Procedures for Investment Advisers 
Public pension plans have significant assets under management, and 
investment advisers associate a certain prestige with winning management 
of public pension plan assets. Therefore, it is likely that investment advisers 
will attempt to comply with the inefficient laws and increased transaction 
costs197 to gain access to these coveted funds.198 To help investment advisers 
comply with these developing laws, this Note proposes a set of compliance 
procedures that most efficiently and comprehensively addresses these 
                                                                                                                         
194 See, e.g., Mary W. Walsh, The Burden of Pensions on States, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/business/11pension.html?pagewanted=all&_r=. 
195 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
196 See generally Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1. 
197 See supra Part IV.A.4. 
198 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 78 (“CalPERS and CalSTERS have a combined $380 
billion in assets under management while the New York City funds total roughly $45 
billion—makes registering as lobbyists the lesser of two evils. No one wants to go to their 
bosses and say: ‘We’ve gotta cut the retirement systems off,’ said a chief compliance 
officer at a New York adviser with city pension fund investments.”). 
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laws. This protocol consists of proactive planning by investment adviser 
personnel, especially with respect to the legal, compliance, and investor 
relations’ departments. 
First, legal and compliance departments must track meetings and contact 
with public pension plans. Therefore, investor relations and other personnel 
that have contact with public pension plans must immediately notify legal 
and compliance of any plans to contact or meet with public pension plans. 
To do so, the department that schedules meetings with potential investors, 
usually the investor relations department, must submit a schedule to the legal 
and compliance departments identifying any planned contact with, or mar-
keting directed at public pension plans. For clarity, this schedule will be 
referred to as the “public pension plan schedule.” The public pension plan 
schedule should specify the particular investment adviser personnel involved, 
the type of contact, the length of contact, and the public pension plan person-
nel involved. This first step will ensure that any registration, if necessary, 
will occur before any substantive contact commences. 
Second, compliance departments must use the public pension plan 
schedule to review each pension plans current state, local, and pension 
specific lobbying laws. This review is similar to the analysis provided in 
this Note, in that compliance department must look at the many layers of 
regulations and determine if the investment adviser activity falls under the 
scope of the definition of lobbying. Compliance must also look to see if 
the relevant jurisdiction’s laws contain exceptions. In this review, the same 
problems arise with interpreting the jurisdiction’s definitions, exceptions 
and reporting requirements. 
Third, after the relevant regulations are reviewed, compliance must keep 
track of time and expenses associated with firm personnel who have had con-
tact with pension plans. Investment adviser personnel who will most readily 
fall into the lobbyist category are those in the investor relations, finance, and 
legal departments. The time and expenses must be organized to track whether 
any personnel pass the spending threshold of the particular jurisdiction’s 
lobbyist regulations.199 Keeping track of the investment advisers’ marketing 
plans and employees’ time and expenses is a large burden and cost, adding 
to the existing responsibilities of legal and compliance departments.200 While 
                                                                                                                         
199 See How States Define “Lobbying” and “Lobbyist”, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/50-state-chart 
-lobby-definitions.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (listing states lobbying definitions and 
illustrating different monetary reporting thresholds). 
200 See Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the 2011 Investment 
Adviser Compliance Conference (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/speech/2011/spch031011tap.htm (“Indeed, the compliance burden on investment advisers 
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the burden of tracking this information is significant, it is a necessary step 
in order to ensure adequate compliance. 
Fourth, if it is determined that any personnel qualify as lobbyists, in-
vestment advisers must then register personnel as lobbyists and comply 
with the relevant lobbying reporting requirements. This step requires pay-
ing the requisite registration fees and filing the necessary forms. In addition, 
some jurisdictions, like California, require lobbying and ethics training. 
Again, the legal and compliance departments must track registration re-
quirements across jurisdictions and file the necessary forms.201 This ongo-
ing reporting requirement—requiring compliance departments to register, 
file, and continually report in all relevant jurisdictions—is a truly burden-
some transaction cost.202 
Furthermore, as the law is ever evolving and political positions are con-
stantly changing, the duty to monitor continually persists. If an investment 
adviser already conducts business with a particular public pension plan that 
previously did not require lobbyist registration but now requires registra-
tion, the investment adviser may need to register in that jurisdiction. Legal 
and compliance departments are thus charged with the duty to preemptively 
monitor state laws for updates.203 Investment advisers, and their covered em-
ployees, are prohibited from making any political contribution to any state 
candidate or politician affiliated with a public pension plan whose assets 
an investment adviser seeks to manage. Furthermore, investment advisers 
must monitor political contributions and shifts in political ambitions. For 
instance, if a governor of a state, for example California, were to run for 
president of the United States, investment advisers would be prohibited from 
making a political contribution to the presidential campaign if they do busi-
ness with any state public pension plan in California.204 Thus, legal and 
compliance departments must ensure that a political contribution is not 
associated with a candidate who is a state politician in a state in which the 
                                                                                                                         
has increased of late due to, for example, the need to comply with the new ‘pay to play’ 
rule restricting political contributions by certain advisers.”). 
201 See, e.g., supra notes 111, 113 and accompanying text. 
202 Similar to the centralized reporting requirements of the SEC, a federal minimum 
reporting requirement for lobbyists would largely reduce this transaction cost. 
203 Although most regulations include a grace period for those affected to come into 
compliance, the sooner an investment advisory firm learns of changes in law, the more time 
that firm has to comply, which likely would result in relatively lower transaction costs. See, 
e.g., e-Lobbyist User Guide, N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMM. 65 (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/misc/pdf/elobbyist_user_guide.pdf. 
204 See Doug Cornelius, Presidential Campaign Season and the SEC’s Pay-to-Play 
Rule, COMPLIANCE BUILDING (Aug. 25, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.compliancebuilding 
.com/2011/08/25/presidential-campaign-season-and-the-secs-pay-to-play-rule/. 
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investment adviser seeks to do business.205 This must be monitored through 
searching covered employees’ political contributions and then determining 
whether there is a conflict.206 
While the proposed compliance protocol is a hefty burden and creates 
more work,207 it is necessary for investment advisers to take proactive and 
preemptive efforts to comply with local and state lobbying laws. Without an 
adequate compliance protocol, investment advisers are vulnerable to vio-
lating the numerous pay-to-play laws, and could be forced to endure bad 
publicity and pay high settlement costs.208 The reputational consequences 
alone serve as a strong incentive for investment firms to incur the necessary 
compliance costs.209 
CONCLUSION 
The development of state laws requiring investment advisers who 
market to public pension plans to register as lobbyists is significant in that 
it establishes a legal precedent that does not clearly achieve its purpose and 
results in an economically detrimental outcome. The prototypes created by 
New York City and the State of California both attempt to increase trans-
parency and reporting requirements for investment advisers in order to 
avoid the repeat of scandals and blatant corruption that propelled the pay-
to-play to legislation. Both prototypes fail to achieve their purpose because 
their definitions of lobbying activity and purported exemptions are unclear. 
The development of lobbying laws in other states further complicates the 
regulatory environment investment advisers face when marketing to public 
pension plans. Public pension plans have also implemented their own self-
imposed restrictions in order to protect themselves, their beneficiaries, and 
garner public confidence. 
Unfortunately, the influx of regulations does the very opposite of what 
it sets forth to achieve: the four levels of regulation create uncertainty. The 
lobbying regulations increase disclosure requirements, but because it is un-
clear who qualifies as a lobbyist, the disclosures fail to paint a clear picture 
of investment adviser activity, provide adequate transparency, or directly 
                                                                                                                         
205 See, e.g., Stefan Passantino, Can Investment Advisors, Private Fund Managers, 
and their Employees Contribute to Governor Perry?, PAY TO PLAY BLOG (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.paytoplaylawblog.com/2011/08/articles/sec/can-investment-advisors-pri 
vate-fund-managers-and-their-employees-contribute-to-governor-perry/. 
206 Political contributions can be tracked by searching http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
and http://www.fec.gov/. 
207 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
208 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
209 Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1. 
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prevent corruption. Furthermore, the various disclosure requirements result 
in an overflow of information that is insignificant because it simply reports 
permitted expenses and does not illustrate the overarching picture. As 
demonstrated above, not only do the increased regulations fail to achieve 
their purpose, they also place a financial burden on investment advisers, the 
SEC, and public pension plans. This financial burden increases transaction 
costs and creates a less efficient return for the beneficiaries of the public 
pension plans and the economy at large. 
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